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INTRODUCTION
The Jurisdictional Statement, Nature of Proceedings, Statement
of Issues on Appeal and Statement of Facts are adequately covered
in Appellant's opening brief. This brief is submitted in reply to
Respondent's brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At the time that the Defendant entered his guilty plea, the
law in Utah required strict compliance with Rule 11(e) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Although the Appellant executed an

Affidavit when he pleaded guilty which recited that a guilty plea
necessarily waived an accused's rights to confrontation, to crossexamine the witnesses against him, to a jury trial, and to an
appeal, the burden for ensuring Rule 11(e) compliance was squarely
on the judge, and an Affidavit was not a sufficient substitute for
Rule 11(e) compliance on the record at the time that the guilty
plea was entered.

The failure of the trial court to fulfill the

requirements of Rule 11(e)(3) on the record at the time the
Defendant entered his plea mandates setting aside the Appellant's
guilty plea and conviction.
On the morning that the Appellant's case was scheduled to go
to trial, a respected and experienced defense lawyer appeared in
court at the request of the County Attorney to assist the Appellant.

Although defense counsel should be commended
1

for his

willingness to volunteer his services on short notice, he was,
under the circumstances, incapable of rendering effective assistance to the Appellant. Counsel could not intelligently assess the
propriety of the denial of the Motion to Suppress without reviewing
the

police

reports

suppression hearing.

and

a transcript

of

the

testimony

at

the

By pleading guilty, the Appellant waived his

right to challenge the trial judge's denial of this Motion to
Suppress.

However, the stop of the Appellant's motor vehicle was

not supported by an articulable suspicion; and as a result, the
order denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress was erroneous.
Competent and effective counsel would not have presumed to advise
an accused to plead guilty without a more thorough understanding
of the search issue.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
(REPLY TO POINT I IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF)
THE DEFENDANT'S PLEA WAS NOT ENTERED IN COMPLIANCE WITH
RULE 11(E) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
STATE V. GIBBONS
The State's opening argument is that because the Defendant did
not file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea before the trial
court, this appeal should be dismissed.

Although it is true that

no motion to withdraw the plea was filed in the trial court, the
facts in the instant matter are essentially identical to the facts

2

in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). On appeal, Gibbons
claimed his guilty plea was entered in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-11 (1982 and Supp. 1986). Because of unusual circumstances
which included the changing of defense counsel during the pendency
of the appeal, no motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed in
the trial court.

Although it is true that the Gibbons Court did

note that an issue first raised on appeal will not ordinarily be
entertained absent exceptional circumstances, the Supreme Court
concluded that the change of defense counsel was an exceptional
circumstance. Moreover, the Supreme Court also noted that a motion
to withdraw the guilty plea, if successful, would render the appeal
of the guilty plea moot. However, if the motion were unsuccessful,
an appeal would then be taken, and two appeals would then result
in the same case. From a purely practical perspective, the Supreme
Court in Gibbons remanded the case to enable the defendant to file
a motion to withdraw the guilty plea with the trial court.

The

Supreme Court also retained jurisdiction over the case for any
necessary future action after the lower court proceedings.

This

approach avoided the possibility of two separate appeals arising
from two different judgments in the same criminal case.
The facts in the instant matter parallel the Gibbons facts.
Here the Defendant represented himself up until the day of trial.
He was then assisted by James Barber for the limited purposes of
3

entering the plea and handling the sentencing. Mr. Barber appeared
in Court to assist the Defendant as a personal favor to David
Yocom, the Salt Lake County Attorney, and Mr. Barber's former law
associate.

Following the entry of the plea and sentencing, the

Defendant filed a Pro Se Notice of Appeal. Defense counsel was not
appointed to assist the Defendant in pursuing his appeal until the
6th day of June, 1989.

Thus, just as in Gibbons, the appeal

process had been commenced and the Defendant found himself in the
same procedural limbo as did the defendant in Gibbons. Under these
circumstances, this Court should entertain the appeal and render
a decision which will assist the trial court in deciding the motion
to withdraw.

Furthermore, retention of jurisdiction by this Court

will preserve Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel issue
if it is not rendered moot by the motion to withdraw the plea. See
Gibbons, Footnote 2, 740 P.2d at 1311-1312.
In its brief, the State has admitted that the trial judge did
not specifically articulate the nature of the constitutional rights
that the Defendant waived by entering his guilty plea. Specifically, the State concedes that the trial judge failed to inquire of
the Defendant whether he understood by pleading guilty that he
waived his rights against self-incrimination, to confrontation, and
to a jury trial. However, the State contends that notwithstanding
State

v.

Gibbons,

740

P. 2d

1308
4

(Utah

1987),

State

v.

Vasilacopulos, 756 P. 2d 92 (Utah App. 1988), and State v. Valencia,
776 P. 2d 1332 (Utah App. 1989), that substantial, and not strict
compliance is all that is required under Rule 11(e)(3). In support
of this proposition, the State asserts on page 7 of its brief that
the aforementioned cases are "inconsistent with recent Utah Supreme
Court rulings and should not be followed".

The State's contention

is erroneous.
In support of its position, the State relies upon Jolivet v.
Cook, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (Utah Aug. 22, 1989), State v.
Cope land, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), and State v. Kay, 717 P.2d
1294 (Utah 1986). Significantly, all three of these cases involved
guilty pleas entered prior to State v. Gibbons, supra.

This is a

rather significant distinction. Thus, although it is true that all
three of these cases discuss the substantial compliance or record
as a whole test, they are pre-Gibbons cases.

State v. Gibbons,

supra, was not given retroactive application. That was so because
a new rule of criminal procedure constituting a clear break with
the past will not be applied retroactively.

Rather, in those

circumstances where a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his
guilty plea under Rule 11 after State v. Gibbons was decided, but
when the guilty plea was actually entered prior to the pronouncement of State v. Gibbons, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the record

5

as a whole test.

See Warner v. Morris, 709 P.2d 309 (Utah 1985)

and Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah 1985).
The facts in Jolivet v. Cook, supra, are interesting and
worthy of mention in light of the State's reliance upon it.
Jolivet claimed that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily
entered.

Specifically, Jolivet argued that Judge Burns erred in

the taking of his guilty pleas because he did not make findings
that Jolivet understood the elements of each crime charged and how
those elements related to the facts. At an evidentiary hearing to
withdraw the guilty pleas, Judge Brian concluded that Jolivet
understood

the elements of each crime charged

and how those

elements related to the facts. Justice Zimmerman, writing for the
Court, concluded that the record facts amply supported the conclusion that Jolivet entered the pleas knowing and understanding full
well the elements of each of the crimes to which he pleaded guilty:
Jolivet is of "above average intelligence'1.
He attended the preliminary hearing at which
the victim testified in detail about the
alleged crimes. The victim's factual statements made out all the elements of each crime
charged. Thereafter, in open court, the judge
stated that he found probable cause and listed
the crimes charged and the alleged facts
relating to those charges. At Jolivetfs first
arraignment proceeding, after the charges were
read, his counsel stated that Jolivet had
requested that the reading of the Amended
Information be waived, that he had received a
preliminary hearing on the matter, that
Jolivet reads, writes, and understands the
English language, and that Jolivet had read

6

the Amended Information and knew its contents*
Then Jolivet, personally responded to the
judge's questions, stated that he had completed two years of college, that he had read
and understood the language in the Amended
Information, and that he wanted to waive its
reading.
The Amended Information lists the
crimes charged, and the facts, in element
form, that make out each element and, lastly,
gives the statutory citation for each crime.
At the beginning of his second arraignment,
both Jolivet and his counsel stated that they
were familiar with and fully aware of all of
the charges. They requested that the charges
not be read or listed again. Nevertheless,
the judge read the charges and the facts
relating to those charges stated. The judge
then asked Jolivet if the factual situations
relating to the crimes charged were fairly and
fully stated. Jolivet answered in the affirmative .
Based upon the foregoing

facts, it is not difficult to

understand why the Supreme Court concluded that Jolivet understood
the elements of each crime charged and how those elements related
to the facts.

His contention to the contrary was frivolous.

Similarly, in State v. Copeland, supra, the defendant also
challenged the voluntariness of his guilty plea.

The gist of his

argument was that the trial court had failed to adequately explain
the nature and elements of the offense.

At the defendant's

arraignment, the trial judge explained that the charge was "a first
degree felony of Sodomy on a Child ... alleging that this occurred
in Cache County on May 1, 1985, by engaging in a sexual act upon
a child under the age of fourteen and involving the genitals of the
7

actor and the mouth of the child."

The Supreme Court noted that

this explanation not only stated the elements of the crime, but
also described the specific act of the defendant and his niece, as
set forth by the defendant in a taped confession available to the
trial judge at the plea hearing.

In dismissing the defendant's

claim, the Supreme Court stated, "We hold that this record demonstrates that defendant admitted acts sufficient to justify his
conviction of the offense to which he pleaded guilty."

Id. at

1273.
Jolivet, Copeland, and Kay are all pre-Gibbons pronouncements
from the Utah Supreme Court. None of these cases are inconsistent
with the rule announced in State v Gibbons:
"Because of the importance of compliance with
Rule 11(e) in Boykin, the law places the
burden of establishing compliance with those
requirements on the trial judge. ... The use
of a sufficient affidavit can promote efficiency, but an affidavit should be only the
starting point, not an end point, in the
pleading process. ... The trial judge should
then review the statements in the affidavit
with the defendant, question the defendant
concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by
§77-35-11 on the record before accepting the
guilty plea. Id. 1313. [Emphasis supplied].
The State's closing salvo involves a creative interpretation
of State v. Thurston, 120 Utah Add. Rep. 30 (Utah App. 1989).

The

State interprets this case to mean that this Court has abandoned
the

strict

compliance

rule

articulated
8

in Vasilacopulos

and

Valencia.

However, this Court did not make such a statement in

State v. Thurston.

The State may wish to interpret State v.

Thurston in such a fashion.

But there is no clear pronouncement

in Thurston that Vasilacopulos and Valencia have been overruled.
Moreover, the facts in State v. Thurston involve a unique Rule
11 situation.

Thurston really involved the interpretation of the

principle that a defendant is entitled to specific performance of
a plea negotiation, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
Thurston pled guilty to two counts of Distribution of a Controlled
Substance.

The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges

against the defendant and to recommend
incarceration.

probation rather than

The State, by and through its deputy county

attorney, fulfilled all of the terms of the plea negotiation. That
is to say, the State did dismiss the additional charges and did
affirmatively

recommend

probation

rather

than

incarceration.

However, the unique problem which arose in Thurston was that
notwithstanding the deputy county attorney's affirmative recommendation for probation, the pre-sentence report included the opinion
of the investigating officer "that fifteen years was not a long
enough term of incarceration for the defendant."

This Court con-

cluded that an investigating police officer is not bound by a
prosecutor's plea bargain to recommend probation.

9

Accordingly,

this Court also decided that the defendant's plea bargain agreement
had not been breached.
The defendant also argued that his guilty plea was involuntary
and should be stricken because he entered the plea in reliance upon
the State's recommendation for probation and that his reliance was
misplaced because of the investigating police officer's contrary
sentencing recommendation.

In considering that contention, this

Court reviewed the record and determined that the defendant had
been fully informed of his rights and the consequences of the
guilty plea:
The judge pursuant to Rule 11, informed defendant of his rights to trial and against selfincrimination and related to him the potential
consequences of his guilty plea. He obtained
assurances from both counsel and defendant
that there was justification for the entry of
the guilty plea. Specifically, the judge's
dialogue with defendant indicates that defendant could not have reasonably held an "exaggerated belief in the benefits of his plea."
The judge made it very clear that he was not
bound by the prosecutor's recommendation of
probation and could, despite the prosecutor's
recommendation and reliance upon the presentence report, impose upon defendant the
maximum penalty prescribed by law, one to
fifteen years imprisonment and a fine of up to
$10,000.00.
Defendant indicated that he
understood, and elected not to change his plea
in the face of this understanding. Id. at 33.
In dismissing the defendant's contention that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea, this Court noted that where the
defendant was aware that there was no guarantee that the trial
10

court would follow the prosecutor's recommendation, there was no
basis to set aside the guilty plea when the trial court did not
follow the prosecutor's recommendation:
Defendant's mere subjective belief as to a
potential sentence is insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary or unknowing. Id. at 33.
The facts in Thurston are unique and completely different from
the Rule 11 violation in this instant matter.

Regardless of what

standard was articulated by this Court in Thurston, whether it was
a record as a whole or strict compliance, there simply was no Rule
11 violation.

Thurston does not overrule Gibbons, Vasilacopulos,

or Valencia.

The Utah Supreme Court has not overruled Gibbons.

Accordingly, it is the law in this State. Because there were Rule
11 violations in the instant matter and because the guilty plea was
entered after the Supreme Court announced State v Gibbons, his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea can only be denied if Gibbons,
Vasilacopulos and Valencia are overruled and replaced with a record
as a whole standard.
POINT II
(REPLY TO POINT II IN RESPONDENTS BRIEF)
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant agrees with the State's assertion that in order to
establish prejudice, the Defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
11

errors, the result of the proceeding below would have been different.

However, the Defendant disagrees with the State's contention

that Barbara Harris's statement established an articulable suspicion that the individuals in the gold car were accomplices.

The

State reads a lot into the statement in order to derive the meaning
that the people in the gold car were involved in the crime.
Before reaching any conclusions in this regard, it is important to analyze precisely what she was asked and what she specifically stated.

The security guard at Harmon's asked her if anybody

was with her.

He did not ask her whether she had any accomplices

or associates in the commission of the forgery offense.

Her

response to this inquiry was, "that there was a gold car out in the
parking lot with the other people that were with her."

(8/16/88

T.6). The Defendant submits that this statement is open to a number
of interpretations. The State's interpretation stretches the plain
meaning of her words.

In the context of the exact question, Ms.

Harris's statement could more easily be read to simply mean that
she was not alone and that she came with some other people who were
out in the car. None of her words imply that the people in the car
had any knowledge that she intended to commit a crime when she
entered the Harmon's store.
meaning of the statement.

The State has stretched the plain
Barbara Harris's statement did not

12

create an articulable suspicion justifying the stop of the motor
vehicle.
CONCLUSION
Gibbons, Vasilacopulos, and Valencia mandate strict compliance with Rule 11 on the record when a guilty plea is entered.

The

Rule 11 violations in this case mandate that the matter be remanded
to the trial court with instructions that the Motion to Withdraw
the Guilty Plea be granted.

The ineffective assistance of counsel

issue should be reserved for future consideration if necessary.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 1990.

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and four correct copies
of the foregoing, first class postage prepaid, on this
of April, 1990 to:
Sandra L.
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

Sjogren
Attorney General
Capitol Building
City, Utah 84114
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APPENDIX 1

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
AL.R. — Antagonistic defenses as ground
fcr«parate trials of codefendants in criminal
OR, 82 A L.R 3d 245

Rule 11

Key Numbers. — Indictment and Information «=» 124 to 131

Sole 10. Arraignment.
(a) Upon t h e return of a n indictment or upon receipt of t h e records from t h e
magistrate following a bind-over, t h e defendant shall forthwith be arraigned
•ithe district court. A r r a i g n m e n t shall be conducted in open court and shall
consist of reading t h e indictment or information to t h e defendant or s t a t i n g to
Urn the substance of t h e charge and calling on h i m to plead thereto. H e shall
le given a copy of t h e indictment or information before h e is called upon to
plead.
(b) If upon arraignment t h e defendant requests additional t i m e in w h i c h to
(lead or otherwise respond, a reasonable t i m e m a y b s granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or w a n t or absence of a n y proceeding prolided for by statute or t h e s e rules prior to a r r a i g n m e n t shall be specifically
ad expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered or t h e s a m e is
waived.
(d) If a defendant h a s been released on bail, or on h i s o w n recognizance,
prior to arraignment and thereafter fails to appear for a r r a i g n m e n t or trial
then required to do so, a warrant of arrest m a y issue a n d bail m a y be forfeited.
f77-35-10, enacted by L. 1 9 8 0 , ch. 14, § 1.)
Cro88-References.
177-35-30.

—

Harmless

error.

Rights of accused, Utah Const, Art I, Sees 7
to 13. * 77-1-6

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Additional time to plead.
Where original information did not state
fikc offense and was amended so as to state
pdbhcoffense for first time, as amending mfor•rion in larceny prosecution so as to allege
•aerehip of property alleged to have been sto-

len, it was equivalent of a new information requiring at raignment of defendant and his plea
thereto, and where defendant was not given
time to plead tor such information, court committed reversible error State v Jensen, 83
Utah 452, 30 P 2d 203 (1934)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am Jur 2d Criminal
Uv {§ 433 to 438
OJ.S. — 22 C J S Criminal Law <>*> 404,
•7, 411.

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •=» 261(1),
263, 264

Sale 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of a n infraction, a defendant shall b e
represented by counsel, u n l e s s t h e defendant w a i v e s counsel in open court,
ad shall not be required to plead until he h a s had a reasonable t i m e to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant reuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
inter a plea of not guilty
349

Rule 11

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. Defendants unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise the defendant, or his
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest and shall
not accept such a plea until the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has knowingly waived his right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial and to confront and cross-examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives
all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence
that may be imposed upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered,
including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement and if so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be approved by the court. If recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation
that other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and the
reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may
then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will
approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that final
disposition should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, he
shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm
or withdraw his plea.
(77-35-11, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 14, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 49, § 6.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment, in Subdivision (b), added "not guilty by
reason of insanity or guilty and mentally ill" to
the first sentence and added the second sentence.

Crofts-References. — Inadmissibility of
pleas, plea discussions or related statements.
Rule 410, U.R.E.
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UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

may commit him to jail until he complies or is
otherwise legally discharged.
(c) If the witness does provide bond when required, he may be examined and cross-examined
before the magistrate in the presence of the defendant and his testimony shall be recorded. He
shall then be discharged.
(d) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing or trial when
ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal
testimony of the witness.
lass
77-35-8. Rule 8 — Appointment of counsel.
A defendant charged with a public offense, other
than an infraction, who is indigent and unable to obtain counsel has the right to court-appointed counsel
if he faces a substantial probability of deprivation of
liberty, or the right to present himself.
iws
77-35-9. Rule 9 — Joinder of offenses and
of defendants.
(a) Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same indictment or information in a separate count
for each offense if the offenses charged arise out of a
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. A
felony offense and a misdemeanor offense may be
charged in the same indictment or information if:
(1) They arise out of a criminal episode; and
(2) The defendant is afforded a preliminary
hearing with respect to the misdemeanor along
with the felony offense.
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the
same indictment or information if they are alleged to
have participated in the same act or conduct or in the
same criminal episode.
Such defendants may be charged in one or more
counts together or separately and ail of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
When two or more defendants are jointly charged
with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the
court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, orders
separate trials consistent with the interests of justice.
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or
informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than one,
could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the
prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution
is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in
an indictment or information, or by a joinder for trial
together, the court shall order an election of separate
trials of separate counts, or grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other relief as justice requires.
A defendant's right to severance of offenses or defendants is waived if the motion is not made at least
five days before trial. In ruling on a motion by defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to disclose any statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at
the trial.

1980

77-35-10. Rule 10 —- Arraignment
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the records from the magistrate following a
bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned
in the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted
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plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or information before he is called upon to plead.
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional time in which to plead or otherwise respond,
a reasonable time may be granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence
of any proceeding provided for by statute or these
rules prior to arraignment shall be specifically and
expressly objected to before a plea of guilty is entered
or the same is waived.
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on
his own recognizance, prior to arraignment and
thereafter fails to appear for arraignment or trial
when required to do so, a warrant of arrest may issue
and bail may be forfeited.
i960
77-35-11. Rule 11 — Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court, and
shall not be required to plead until he has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty and
mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a
defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the
consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty,
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. Defendants
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In non-felony cases the court shall advise
the defendant, or his counsel, of the requirements for
making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty
or no contest and shall not accept such a plea until
the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by
counsel he has knowingly waived his right to
counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury
trial and to confront and cross-examine in open
court the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of those rights;
(4) That the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which he is entering the plea; that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those
elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that
the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum
and maximum sentence that may be imposed
upon him for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition
of consecutive sentences; and
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result of a
prior plea discussion and plea agreement and if
so, what agreement has been reached.
If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any
other party has agreed to request or recommend the
acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or
the dismissal of other charges, the same shall be approved by the court. If recommendations as to sen*An,.A OTO aUnwcxA hv the murt. the court shall advise
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(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement
h a s been reached which contemplates entry of a plea
in the expectation t h a t other charges will be dropped
or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the parties,
may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative
agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the
time for tender of the plea The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether he will approve the proposed disposition
Thereafter, if the judge decides t h a t final disposition
should not be handled in conformity with the plea
agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and then
call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw
his plea
1963
77-35-12.

Rule

12 —

Motions.

(a) An application to the court for an order shall be
by motion A motion other than one made during a
trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court
otherwise permits It shall state with particularity
the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth
the relief sought It may be supported by affidavit or
by evidence
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence,
which is capable of determination without the trial of
the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion The following shall be raised at least five
days prior to the trial
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects in
the indictment or information other than that it
fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge
an offense, which objection shall be noticed by
the court at any time during the pendency of the
proceeding,
(2) Motions concerning the admissibility of evidence,
(3) Requests for discovery where allowed,
(4) Requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9, or
(5) Motions to dismiss on the ground of double
jeopardy
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined
before trial unless the court for good cause orders that
the ruling be deferred for later determination Where
factual issues are involved in determining a motion,
the court shall state its findings on the record
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must
be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court
shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for
cause shown may grant relief from such waiver
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record
shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on
motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally
(0 If the court grants a motion based on a defect in
the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment
or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the
filing of a new indictment or information Nothing in
this rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law
relating to a statute of limitations
(g) (1) In any motion concerning the admissibility
of evidence or the suppression of evidence pursu
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good faith The court shall set forth its reasons
for such finding
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in all
cases be deemed substantial if one or more of the
following is established by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the evidence
d) The violation was grossly negligent,
willful, malicious, shocking to the conscience
of the court or was a result of the practice of
the law enforcement agency pursuant to a
general order of that agency,
(n) The violation was intended only to harass without legitimate law enforcement
purposes
(3) In determining whether a peace officer was
acting in good faith under this section, the court
shall consider, in addition to any other relevant
factors, some or all of the following
d) The extent of deviation from legal
search and seizure standards,
(n) The extent to which exclusion will
tend to deter future violations of search and
seizure standards,
(in) Whether or not the officer was proceeding by way of a search warrant, arrest
warrant, or relying on previous specific directions of a magistrate or prosecutor, or
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes
t h a t the search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a preponderance of the evidence, the
peace officer or governmental agency must then,
by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the
good faith actions of the peace officer
1982
77-35-13.

Rule 13 — Pre-trial conference.

(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a
pre-tnal conference, with trial counsel present, to
consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial The accused shall be present unless he
waives his nght to appear
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pre-trial
order shall set out the matters ruled upon Any stipulations made shall be signed by counsel, approved by
the court and filed, and shall be 'binding upon the
parties at trial, on appeal, and in post-conviction proceedings unless set aside or modified by the court
1980

77-35-14. Rule 14 — Subpoena.
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before a court magistrate or
grand jury, in connection with a criminal investiga
tion or prosecution may be issued by the magistrate
with whom an information is filed, the county attorney on his own initiative or upon the direction of the
grand jury, or the court in which an information or
indictment is to be tned The clerk of the court in
which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the
defendant, without charge as manv signed subpoenas as the defendant may require
fb) A subpoena may command the person to whom
it is directed to appear and testify or to produce in
court or to allow inspection of records papers or other
objects The court ma> quash or modify the subpoena

